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POSTED PRICES AND BID AFFILIATION:
EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS
JAY R. CORRIGAN AND MATTHEW C. ROUSU
In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple po-
tentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those
rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are afﬁliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this
practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment
designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We ﬁnd that for familiar
items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications
for researchers conducting experimental auctions.
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Experimental auctions have become a pop-
ular tool in many branches of economics,
includingagricultural,environmental,andreg-
ulatory economics. Economists have used
experimental auctions to examine issues
such as the willingness-to-pay/willingness-to-
acceptdisparity(e.g.,Kahneman,Knetsch,and
Thaler1990;Shogrenetal.1994;Shogrenetal.
2001), the value of information regarding food
products(e.g.,Huffmanetal.2003;Rousuetal.
2002, 2004), and pricing in electricity markets
(e.g., Abbink, Brandts, and McDaniel 2003).
Repeated trials are now a standard practice in
experimental auctions. In repeated trial auc-
tions participants place bids on the same prod-
uctsinmultiplepotentiallybindingrounds,and
the experimenter posts one or more of the bid
prices after each round.1
Inthisarticlewetakeafreshlookatwhether
posted prices affect bids in later rounds. This
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article advances the literature in several im-
portant ways. First, we report the design and
results of the only study designed speciﬁcally
to control for the effects of posted prices on
bids in subsequent rounds. We do this with the
aidofconfederatebidderswhowereinstructed
to bid within a certain narrow range. Thus, we
have multiple treatments that vary only by the
presenceorabsenceofconfederatebidders,al-
lowing for what we believe to be the cleanest
possible test of the effect of posted prices on
bidding behavior in later rounds. While List
and Shogren (1999) model bids in round t as
a function of the posted price in round t−1,
throughouruseofconfederatebidderstocon-
trol posted prices we are able to test whether
exposure to high posted prices has an effect
that accumulates over the course of multiple
rounds, leading to a gradual increase in mean
bids.
Second, our methods of analysis are more
completethanpreviousworkexaminingbidaf-
ﬁliation.Wenotonlycomparesummarystatis-
tics from early and late rounds, but we also
use panel data analysis to understand how in-
dividual participants’ bids are affected by the
presence of confederate bidders. Focusing on
individuals rather than summary statistics al-
lows us to understand how individual-speciﬁc
characteristics inﬂuence afﬁliation, and it also
allows us to better understand the role of out-
liers.
Finally,welookatwhetherthereisamethod
researchers can use ex ante to mitigate the ef-
fect of aberrant posted prices on other par-
ticipants’ bids in subsequent rounds. Given
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the current ubiquity of repeated trials, this
research has important implications for the
rapidly expanding body of research using ex-
perimental auctions.
Posted Prices, Repeated Trials, Afﬁliation,
and Experimental Auction Valuation
There are arguments both in favor of and
against repeated trial auctions. Among the ar-
guments in favor of repeated trials is that the
practice allows participants to learn about the
auctionformatandtoformvaluesinamarket-
likesetting.Manybelievethisimprovestheac-
curacy of value estimates (see, e.g., Alfnes and
Rickertsen 2003; Hayes et al. 1995; Lusk et al.
2001; Shogren et al. 1994; Shogren et al. 2001).
While the practice of using repeated trials is
widespread, not all experimental economists
endorse this method (e.g., Rousu et al. 2004).
Knetsch,Tang,andThaler(2001)ﬁndthatbids
in a repeated-trial auction are inﬂuenced by
the choice of auction mechanism. Speciﬁcally,
they show that willingness to pay (WTP) bids
submitted in the later rounds of a repeated
second-price auction are signiﬁcantly higher
than those submitted in the later rounds of
a repeated ninth-price auction. Shogren et al.
(2001) report that mean WTP bids increase in
a repeated second-price auction, but not in a
repeatedBecker–DeGroot–Marschak(BDM)
auction where the market feedback provides
no information about the upper support of the
value distribution.
We believe these inconsistencies may be
drivenbybidafﬁliation.Inthisarticle,wedraw
a distinction between bid afﬁliation where a
highbidsubmittedbyoneparticipantmaylead
otherparticipantstosubmithigherbidsinlater
rounds (List and Shogren 1999), and value af-
ﬁliation where “a higher value of the item for
one bidder makes higher values for other bid-
ders more likely” (Kagel 1995, p. 517).2 Bid
afﬁliation is a broader concept than value af-
ﬁliation because, as we will discuss, positive
correlation between bids may or may not be
caused by positive correlation between values.






values. First, participants may be unfamiliar
2 Value afﬁliation is often discussed in relation to auctions for
common-value goods such as off-shore drilling rights.
with a product and therefore uncertain of the
value they would derive from it. They may,
however, suspect other participants are better
informed,inwhichcasepostedpricesmaypro-
videmoreinformationabouttheproduct(Har-
rison, Harstad, and Rutstr¨ om 2004). Second,
even if the participants are certain of the value
they place on a product, they may be uncer-
tain of the price the good can be purchased for
outsideoftheexperimentalauctionmarket.In
this situation, posted prices may provide these
participants with valuable feedback, assuming
they believe that other participants have bet-
ter information about the outside price (Kol-
stad and Guzman 1999). Third, bidders might
derive utility from winning for winning’s sake
(Shogren and Hayes 1997). In the presence of
a “top-dog effect,” high posted prices would
cause participants who derive utility from be-
ing declared the winner to submit higher bids.
Fourth, if participants observe posted prices
signiﬁcantly higher than their own bids, they
may feel they have no chance of winning the
auction. This would essentially turn the exper-
iment into a hypothetical auction, and there
is a sizeable literature showing that partici-
pants in hypothetical valuation exercises sub-
mit signiﬁcantly higher bids (e.g., Fox et al.
1998; Cummings and Taylor 1999; List 2001).
Fifth, posted prices may provide feedback re-
garding the credibility of the auction market
itself. If, for example, participants are skep-
tical of the quality of the goods being auc-
tioned off relative to outside substitutes, or
are skeptical about whether the good will ac-
tuallybedelivered,highpostedpricesmaysig-
nal that other participants are conﬁdent in the
auctionmarket,therebyboostingtheskeptical
bidders’conﬁdence.Finally,participantsmight
be inﬂuenced by a behavioral “anchoring ef-
fect,” where their bids tend to gravitate to-
ward the posted price (Nunes and Boatwright
2004).
Kagel, Harstad, and Levin (1987) ﬁnd no
evidence of bid afﬁliation in induced value
auctions. Using auctions for products with
homegrown values, List and Shogren (1999)
ﬁnd that posted prices affected median bids
for unfamiliar products, but not for familiar
products. The authors conclude that any effect
of afﬁliation on median bids is small. How-
ever, their analysis focuses solely on median
WTP bids from each group of participants.
This is in contrast with the empirical litera-
ture, which has focused almost exclusively on
eithermeanWTPestimates(e.g.,Shogrenetal.
1994; Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler 2001), or on
tests that use individual participants’ bids in a1080 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
regression or other conditional analysis (e.g.,
Lusk et al. 2001).
The idea that posted prices may affect WTP
is not restricted to laboratory auctions. Nunes
and Boatwright (2004) ﬁnd that bid afﬁliation
occursinﬁeldauctionsaswell.Forexample,in
one of their experiments participants submit-
ting bids for a music CD were differentiated
by their passive exposure to the price posted
for an unrelated product (a sweatshirt) by a
nearby confederate vendor. The price of the
unrelated good, which the authors refer to as
an “incidental price,” presumably should have
no impact on participants’ WTP for the CD.
However, Nunes and Boatwright (2004) ﬁnd
that increasing the posted price of the sweat-
shirt from $10 to $80 increases the mean bid
for the CD from $7.29 to $9.00. Similarly, the
authors ﬁnd that incidental prices have a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant effect on WTP bids in a
nonexperimental English auction for classic
automobiles. In particular, focusing on pairs
of unrelated cars up for auction one after the
other, they ﬁnd that the premium the winning
bidderpaysforthesecondcarrelativetoitslist
price is positively correlated with the winning
bid for ﬁrst car.
Taken as a whole, Nunes and Boatwright’s
(2004) study provides compelling evidence
that seemingly irrelevant prices affect bidders’
decisions, yet experimental auction practition-
ers continue to debate this issue. We think this
is due largely to there having been no experi-
mental auction studies speciﬁcally designed to
test for bid afﬁliation. In the next section we
discuss the design of just such an experiment.
Experimental Design
To address our research questions, we
held experimental auction sessions with 101
undergraduate economics students at three
institutions: Kenyon College, North Carolina
State University (NC State), and The Ohio
State University (OSU). All participants were
paid $10 for taking part in the study. The par-
ticipantsbidononestandard-size(1.55ounce)
Hershey’s candy bar and one university-logo
coffeemug.Atthetimetheauctionswerecon-
ducted, an identical candy bar could be pur-
chased at nearby shops for about $0.65. All
three coffee mugs were bought at the insti-
tutions’ respective campus bookstores, where
the Kenyon mug cost $3.95, the NC State
mug cost $4.65, and the OSU mug cost $3.99.
We chose to sell a candy bar and a coffee
mug because these products have been used
in many experimental auction studies. In ad-
dition, in the case of the candy bar, partici-
pants were likely familiar with both the good
and its price outside of the experimental auc-
tion.Inthecaseofthecoffeemug,ontheother
hand,whileparticipantswerefamiliarwiththe
good, they were likely uncertain of the speciﬁc
mug’s outside price. For example, at the time
this study was conducted, the Kenyon College
bookstore offered twenty-seven different cof-
fee mugs ranging in price from $3.33 to $14.62.
Webelievethisdistinctionisimportant.Ofthe
six explanations for bid afﬁliation discussed
above, all but the ﬁrst might apply to familiar
goods like coffee mugs and candy bars. Of the
remaining ﬁve explanations, the most ortho-
dox is that bid afﬁliation is more likely to oc-
cur if bidders are uncertain of a good’s outside
price but they believe their fellow participants
may have better information about that price.
Withthatinmind,thefactthatweﬁndthatbids
are afﬁliated for both familiar goods with un-
familiar outside prices and familiar goods with
familiar outside prices is all the more striking.
We began by providing participants with
both written and oral instructions on the
second-price, sealed-bid auction mechanism
(Vickrey 1961), followed by a short quiz to
ensure their understanding.3 All participants
then took part in ten rounds of bidding on
a candy bar and ten rounds of bidding on a
coffee mug. Similar to other studies, only one
round from each set of ten was chosen to be
binding (or valid) so participants would not
have to worry about winning multiple units of
anyproduct.Aftereachround,thetwohighest
bidswerepostedatthefrontoftheroomalong
with the bidders’ ID numbers. By identifying
the top two bids along with the ID numbers
of those bidders, participants could uniquely
(yet anonymously) identify the auction win-
ner and the participant whose bid determined
the market price. After each set of rounds,
the monitor randomly determined the binding
round and announced the winner’s ID num-
ber. Transactions were executed at the end of
the experiment.4
Inordertoprovidethecleanestpossibletest
of the effect of posted prices, we introduced
two confederate bidders into some of the
3 While there are many demand-revealing auction mechanisms
(e.g., the random nth-price and Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auc-
tions), we chose to use the second-price auction because of its
overwhelming popularity in repeated-trial auction studies. For ex-
ample, List and Shogren (1999) use data from more than forty
repeated-trial second-price auction experiments.
4 The instructions given to auction participants are available in
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Table 1. Summary of Experimental Sessions
Number of Candy Bar Coffee Mug
Session Location Participants Confederates? Confederates?
A Kenyon 19 No No
B OSU 9 No No
C Kenyon 10 No Yes
D OSU 15 No Yes
E NC State 11 No Yes
F Kenyon 16 Yes Yes
G NC State 21 Yes Yes
treatments. (The makeup of our sessions is de-
scribed in table 1.) These confederates were
instructed in advance to place speciﬁc bids for
the products. In the coffee mug rounds we in-




and $1.70 and the other to bid between $1.80
and $1.90. The confederate bidders were al-
lowed to vary their bids within these ranges
across rounds. The use of confederate bidders
gives us much more control over posted prices
relative to previous studies.
We use these experimental auctions to ex-
aminethreeresearchquestions.Inexperiment
1, we look at how posted prices affect bids for
a familiar product with a less familiar price.
In this experiment our treatment and control
groups differ based on the presence or ab-
senceofconfederatebiddersinthecoffeemug
rounds only. In experiment 2, we look at how
posted prices affect bids for a familiar product
with a more familiar price. In this experiment
our treatment and control groups differ based
onthepresenceorabsenceofconfederatebid-
ders in the candy bar rounds. In experiment 3,
we look at whether the effects of posted prices
can be mitigated if participants are repeatedly
exposed to confederates. In particular, we test
whether participants initially exposed to con-
federates in the candy bar rounds will also be
affectedbyhighpostedpricesinthecoffeemug
rounds.
Experiment 1: How Do Posted Prices Affect
Bids for a Familiar Product with a Less
Familiar Market Price?
Twenty-eight participants from sessions A and
Btookpartinthecontroltreatment.Thesepar-
ticipants were never exposed to confederate
bidders. Thirty-six participants from sessions
C, D, and E took part in the confederate




shown in table 2, and the mean bids from
each of the ten rounds for both the control
and confederate treatments are plotted in ﬁg-
ure 1.5 Note that the mean bids increased over
time in both treatments, but that the increase
was much more dramatic in the confederate
treatment.6
For a tighter focus on the effect of confeder-
ate bidders on bidding behavior, we examine
the bids from rounds 1 and 9 more closely. De-
scriptivestatisticsfromrounds1and9arepre-
sented in table 3. It is worth noting that in two
of the confederate units, the second confed-
erate was outbid in round 9 by a participant
whose bid increased several dollars between
rounds 1 and 9. The mean bids for the cof-
fee mug increased in both the confederate and
control treatments, but the increase was more
than 200% greater in the confederate treat-
ment. This $0.95 difference in the increase in
meanbidsacrosstheexperimentalandcontrol
treatments is statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.02
levelinaone-sidedt-test.7Whilethedifference
5 Our confederate bidders did not bid their true value, but the
values we asked them to bid. Therefore, their bids are excluded
from all of our statistical analyses.
6 The increase in bids in the control group is consistent with List
and Shogren’s ﬁnding that bids tend to increase in repeated-trial
Vickrey auctions. There is evidence that different auction mech-
anisms might yield different results. For example, Shogren et al.
(2001)ﬁndthatmeanWTPbidsincreaseacrossroundsinasecond-
price auction but not in a BDM auction. Lusk, Alexander, and
Rousu (2004) show that the BDM, random nth-price, and second-
price auction mechanisms provide different incentives for partic-
ipants to remain truthful and Lusk and Rousu (in press) support
this result empirically.
7 We chose to focus our analysis on round 9 instead of round
10 because of evidence that participants often behave unusually
in the last round of an experiment (Friedman and Sunder 1994).
However, to make sure that our ﬁndings are not driven by unusual1082 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Coffee Mug Bids in Experiment 1
Control Treatment (N = 28) Confederate Treatment (N = 36)
Standard Zero Standard Zero
Mean Median Deviation Bids Mean Median Deviation Bids
Round 1 $1.04 $1.00 $0.86 28.6% $1.26 $0.72 $1.36 11.1%
Round 2 $1.20 $1.00 $0.90 21.4% $1.68 $1.13 $1.56 11.1%
Round 3 $1.34 $1.25 $0.95 21.4% $2.04 $1.25 $2.03 13.9%
Round 4 $1.49 $1.31 $1.05 21.4% $2.07 $1.00 $2.11 11.1%
Round 5 $1.50 $1.29 $1.21 21.4% $2.40 $1.00 $2.72 11.1%
Round 6 $1.46 $1.27 $1.13 21.4% $2.04 $1.00 $2.53 16.7%
Round 7 $1.49 $1.25 $1.18 21.4% $2.39 $1.00 $2.84 16.7%
Round 8 $1.55 $1.28 $1.17 28.6% $2.56 $1.07 $3.04 19.4%
Round 9 $1.48 $1.23 $1.15 25.0% $2.65 $1.00 $3.01 16.7%

































Control Treatment (N = 28)
Confederate Treatment (N = 36)
Figure 1. Mean bids for the coffee mug across
rounds in experiment 1
in mean bids reveals a large posted-price ef-
fect, median bids do not differ as dramatically
across the treatments. A Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, which can be thought of as comparing dif-
ferences in medians instead of means, shows
that the difference is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant(p=0.30).ThisisconsistentwithListand
Shogren’s (1999) ﬁnding that the median bid
for familiar goods increases across rounds but
is not signiﬁcantly impacted by posted prices.
Figure 2 plots participants’ round 1 bids
against the change in their bids between
rounds1and9.Understandingthedistribution
of bid increases depicted in this ﬁgure is key to
understanding how our results relate to List
and Shogren’s. The ﬁgure shows that the in-
crease in bids across rounds in the confederate
results from one particular round, we ran the same test comparing
the mean bids from rounds 1 through 3 with those from rounds
8 through 10, and found results that were qualitatively similar
(p = 0.04 in a one-sided t-test). We also repeated these tests af-
ter excluding zero bidders, and again found qualitatively similar
results (p = 0.03 in a one-sided t-test comparing rounds 1 and 9,
and p = 0.05 in a one-sided t-test comparing rounds 1 through 3
and 8 through 10). These and all other nonpublished results are
available in Corrigan and Rousu (2006b).
treatment, though positively skewed, is clearly
greater than that in the control treatment and
that this difference is not solely driven by a
smallgroupofextremeoutliers.Thisresultun-
derscores the importance of focusing on more
than one moment of the distribution when
making inferences in experimental auctions.
Figure 2 also shows that high posted prices can
cause bidders at any point in the value distri-
bution to increase their bids. Normal correla-
tion analysis (Freund 1992) shows that there
is no statistically signiﬁcant correlation be-
tweenround1bidsandchangeinbidsbetween
rounds 1 and 9 (p = 0.33).
In order to account for the panel nature
of our data, we use random-effects regression
analysis to estimate individuals’ bids as
Bidit =  i +  T +  (Ci × T) + εit (1)
where Bit is participant i’s bid in round t,  i
is a random-effects intercept term, T is a time
trend, Ci is a dummy variable equal to one if
individual i is bidding in the confederate treat-
ment,andεit isacontemporaneouserrorterm.
This speciﬁcation allows us test whether in-
dividuals’ bids increase more rapidly in the
confederate treatment. We believe that this
speciﬁcationissuperiortoestimatingbidssub-
mitted in round t as a function of the posted
price in round t–1 because it allows for the
effects of high posted prices to “accumulate”
over more than one round.
Column 1 of table 4 presents the random-
effects estimation results for equation (1).
The coefﬁcient associated with the time trend
T is positive but only marginally signiﬁcant
(p = 0.08). The coefﬁcient associated with the
cross term (Ci × T) is positive and highlyCorrigan and Rousu Posted Prices and Bid Afﬁliation 1083
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Coffee Mug Bids in Experiment 1
Round 1 Round 9 Difference
Control treatment (N = 28)
Mean $1.04 $1.48 $0.44
Median $1.00 $1.23 $0.23
Mean market price $2.47 $2.56
Confederate treatment (N = 36)
Mean $1.26 $2.65 $1.39∗
Median $0.72 $1.00 $0.28
Mean market price $8.65 $8.91







































9 Control Treatment (N = 28)
Confederate Treatment (N = 36)
Figure 2. Initial coffee mug bids versus in-
crease across rounds in experiment 1
signiﬁcant (p < 0.01), indicating that individ-
uals’ bids increase signiﬁcantly more across
rounds in the presence of confederate bidders.
Speciﬁcally, bids submitted by participants in
the confederate treatment increased, on aver-
age, by $0.104 more per round than did the
bids of participants in the control treatment.
This result underscores the importance of our
confederate-bidderdesign,inthatitshowsthat
the observed increase in mean bids in the con-
federate treatment is not simply due to re-
peated bidding, but is the result of persistently
high posted prices.
Tobetterunderstandifparticipants’individ-
ual characteristics are driving bid afﬁliation,
wealsouserandom-effectsanalysistoestimate
individuals’ bids as
Bidit =  i +   Xi +  T +  (Ci × T)
+ (Xi × Ci × T) + εit
(2)
where Xi is a matrix including participants’
gender, mean-deleted monthly disposable
income (in hundreds of dollars), and mean-
deleted cumulative grade point average
(GPA).8 Column 2 of table 4 presents the
8 Here and in equation (1) we allow for idiosyncratic effects to
inﬂuence the intercept (i.e., participant i’s bid in round 1) but not
the time trend coefﬁcient   (i.e., the round-on-round increase in
Table 4. Random-Effects Estimation Results













Trend × confederate 0.105∗∗ 0.040
(0.000) (0.268)
Trend × confederate — 0.114∗∗
× male (0.003)
Trend × confederate — −0.002
× income (0.848)
Trend × confederate — 0.253∗∗
× GPA (0.000)
R2 0.057 0.079
Note: Single (∗) and double (∗∗) asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the levels
0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
ap-values in parentheses.
estimation results for equation (2). The coefﬁ-
cient associated with the time trend T is once
again positive but only marginally signiﬁcant
(p = 0.07). And while none of the socioe-
conomic intercept terms are signiﬁcantly
different from zero, both gender and GPA
have a positive and highly signiﬁcant effect on
the rate at which bids increase in the confeder-
ate treatment (p < 0.01 for both coefﬁcients).
bids in the absence of confederates). We have chosen this spec-
iﬁcation because while it is obvious that unmodeled, individual-
speciﬁc characteristics like a participant’s fondness for coffee may
inﬂuenceherinitialbidforacoffeemug,itisnotobviouswhythese
unmodeled characteristics would inﬂuence changes in bidding be-
havior across rounds.1084 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 5. Summary Statistics for the Candy Bar Bids in Experiment 2
Control Treatment (N = 64) Confederate Treatment (N = 37)
Standard Zero Standard Zero
Mean Median Deviation Bids Mean Median Deviation Bids
Round 1 $0.39 $0.25 $0.58 29.7% $0.28 $0.25 $0.27 16.2%
Round 2 $0.39 $0.25 $0.50 28.1% $0.39 $0.25 $0.54 32.4%
Round 3 $0.39 $0.32 $0.35 26.6% $0.47 $0.40 $0.52 27.0%
Round 4 $0.41 $0.35 $0.35 28.1% $0.48 $0.40 $0.49 24.3%
Round 5 $0.41 $0.40 $0.34 29.7% $0.53 $0.50 $0.53 21.6%
Round 6 $0.40 $0.41 $0.34 29.7% $0.52 $0.40 $0.60 21.6%
Round 7 $0.44 $0.45 $0.39 26.6% $0.54 $0.40 $0.55 21.6%
Round 8 $0.40 $0.40 $0.31 28.1% $0.55 $0.50 $0.57 27.0%
Round 9 $0.39 $0.40 $0.31 25.0% $0.62 $0.50 $0.64 32.4%
Round 10 $0.40 $0.40 $0.32 26.6% $0.55 $0.50 $0.55 27.0%
In particular, the gender coefﬁcient suggests
that in the confederate treatment, male par-
ticipants’ bids increased more rapidly than
females’ by an average of $0.113 per round,
perhaps suggesting that men are more driven
to be declared the winner of an auction. Simi-
larly,intheconfederatetreatmentaone-tenth-
point increase in GPA corresponds to a $0.025
per-round increase in bids. While it may ini-
tially seem surprising that better students are
more likely to be “fooled” by confederate bid-
ders, this result may suggest that the more
studious participants are those most likely to
realize that even a private-value good has a
common-value component when there is un-
certainty surrounding the good’s outside price
(Kolstad and Guzman 1999). As we will show
in the next section, the correlation between
GPAandincreasingbidsdisappearswhenpar-
ticipants bid on a good with a more familiar
market price.
Most strikingly, though, the coefﬁcient asso-
ciated with (Ci × T) is no longer signiﬁcantly
different from zero (p = 0.27), indicating that
female students with average GPAs are not
affected by high posted prices. In sum, these
results suggest that the difference in bidding
behavior between the control and confeder-
ate treatments is driven by men and above-
average students.
Experiment 2: How Do Posted Prices Affect
Bids for a Familiar Product with a More
Familiar Market Price?
For experiment 2, we used the same proce-
dures as in experiment 1. Sixty-four partici-
pants from sessions A through E took part
in the control treatment, while thirty-seven
participantsfromsessionsFandGtookpartin
the confederate treatment. This experiment is
of interest because candy bars of similar sizes
generally have prices that are fairly consistent
across stores and across brands. Because par-
ticipants likely entered this experiment famil-
iar with both the candy bar for sale and its
outside market price, any bid afﬁliation can-
not simply be attributed to participants using
posted prices as a signal of the good’s out-
side price. Bid afﬁliation in this experiment
mustinsteadbeattributedtolessconventional
explanations such as anchoring or top-dog
effects.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for
bidding on the candy bar in all ten rounds for
each treatment. Figure 3 shows the mean bid
across rounds for both the control and con-
federate treatments. In the control treatment
there is very little change in the mean bid
across rounds. In the confederate treatment,
however, the mean bid more than doubles be-
tween rounds 1 and 9.
Table 6 focuses more carefully on the differ-
ence between rounds 1 and 9. Note that while

































Control Treatment (N = 64)
Confederate Treatment (N = 37)
Figure 3. Mean bids for the candy bar across
rounds in experiment 2Corrigan and Rousu Posted Prices and Bid Afﬁliation 1085
Table 6. Summary Statistics for Candy Bar Bids in Experiment 2
Round 1 Round 9 Difference
Control treatment (N = 64)
Mean $0.39 $0.39 $0.00
Median $0.25 $0.40 $0.15
Mean market price $0.67 $0.70
Confederate treatment (N = 37)
Mean $0.28 $0.62 $0.34∗
Median $0.25 $0.50 $0.25∗∗
Mean market price $1.65 $1.83
Note: Single (∗) and double (∗∗) asterisks denote statistically different across treatments at the 0.01 level (t = 2.98)
and at the 0.02 level using a one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 2.21), respectively.
in mean bids, in the confederate treatment
there is a $0.34 increase. This difference in
the overall increase in mean bids between
the control and confederate treatments is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant using a one-sided t-test
(p<0.01).9 Similarly,thedifferenceinmedian
bidsisstatisticallysigniﬁcantusingaone-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.02). This con-
trastswithListandShogren(1999),whofound
that posted prices did not affect median bids
for familiar items.10
Figure 4 plots participants’ round 1 bids
against the change in their bids between
rounds 1 and 9. As in experiment 1, the ﬁgure
shows that our results are not being driven by
afewextremeoutliers.Inthisexperimentboth
mean and median bids increased signiﬁcantly
despite the fact that candy bars have a rela-
tively familiar market price. This increase in
bids, despite the familiarity of the good and its
outside price, suggests that the bid afﬁliation
observed in this experiment is driven less by
perceptions that posted prices contain mean-
ingful market information than it is by alter-
native explanations such as a top-dog effect
or by the anchoring effect of incidental prices.
Figure 4 also shows that large bid increases
are not limited to either high or low bidders
9 Again, results are qualitatively similar comparing mean bids
from rounds 1 through 3 with those from rounds 8 through 10, or
if zero bidders are excluded.
10 As mentioned earlier, an identical candy bar could be pur-
chased outside of the experiment at nearby shops for about $0.65.
In the control treatment, nine out of sixty-four participants sub-
mitted bids greater than this $0.65 outside price in round 1, versus
thirteen out of sixty-four in round 9. A chi-square test of indepen-
dence fails to reject the null hypothesis that these two frequencies
are equal (p = 0.35). In the confederate treatment, three out of
thirty-seven participants submitted bids greater than the outside
price in round 1, versus thirteen out of thirty-seven in round 9.
In this case, a chi-square test of independence rejects the null hy-
pothesisthatthesetwofrequenciesareequal(p<0.01),suggesting
that confederates were capable of prompting some participants to






































9 Control Treatment (N = 64)
Confederate Treatment (N = 37)
Figure4. Initialcandybarbidsversusincrease
across rounds in experiment 2
in the confederate treatment. Normal correla-
tionanalysisagainshowsthatthereisnostatis-
tically signiﬁcant correlation between round 1
bids and change in bids between rounds 1 and
9 in the confederate treatment (p = 0.20).
To better understand the impact of high
posted prices on individuals’ candy bar bids
we use random-effects regression analysis as
in equations (1) and (2). Column 1 of table 7
presents the random-effects estimation results
forequation(1).Asinexperiment1,thecoefﬁ-
cient associated with the cross term (Ci × T)i s
positiveandhighlysigniﬁcant(p<0.01),again
indicatingthatindividuals’bidsincreasesignif-
icantly more across rounds in the presence of
confederate bidders. Speciﬁcally, bids submit-
ted by participants in the confederate treat-
ment increased, on average, by $0.025 more
per round than did the bids of participants in
the control treatment.
However, column 2 shows that understand-
ing the role of socioeconomic characteristics
is key to understanding bid afﬁliation. Simi-
lar to the results from experiment 1, we again
ﬁnd that male participants are signiﬁcantly
more likely to increase their bids when ex-
posed to high posted prices (p = 0.03), this
time by an average of $0.023 per round, and
that the coefﬁcient associated with (Ci × T)1086 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 7. Random-Effects Estimation Results













Trend × confederate 0.025∗∗ 0.009
(0.000) (0.310)
Trend × confederate — 0.023∗
× male (0.031)
Trend × confederate — −0.014∗∗
× income (0.000)
Trend × confederate — −0.002
× GPA (0.871)
R2 0.019 0.066
Note: Single (∗) and double (∗∗) asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the levels
0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
ap-values in parentheses.
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero (p =
0.31). Here, income has a statistically signiﬁ-
cant impact on both starting bids and the de-
gree to which bids increase across rounds in
the presence of confederates (p < 0.01 in both
cases). However, while higher-income partici-




Experiment 3: How Does Repeated Exposure
Affect the Bias from Posted Prices?
Ourresultsshowthathighpostedpricescanin-
crease bids for familiar products in a repeated
trial auction both on average and in certain
demographic subgroups. It would be helpful
to ﬁnd a method that could mitigate this bias
ex ante. To explore this possibility, we exam-
ine the coffee mug bids submitted by partic-
ipants who were ﬁrst exposed to confederate
bidders in the candy bar rounds and were then
exposedtothesameconfederatebiddersinthe
coffee mug rounds. Twenty-eight participants
from sessions A and B took part in the con-
trol treatment where they were never exposed

































Control Treatment (N = 28)
Confederate Treatment (N = 36)
Double Confederate Treatment (N = 37)
Figure5. Meanbidsforthecoffeemugacross
rounds in experiment 3, including the bidders
in the rounds with the confederate bidders for
both the coffee mug and the candy bar
from sessions C, D, and E took part in the
confederate treatment where they were only
exposed to confederate bidders in the coffee
mug rounds. Thirty-seven students from ses-
sionsFandGtookpartinthe“doubleconfed-
erate treatment” where they were exposed to
confederate bidders in both the candy bar and
coffee mug rounds.
Figure 5 shows the mean bids across rounds
from the control and confederate treatments
described under experiment 1, and from
the double confederate treatment. Table 8
presents summary statistics from the control,
confederate, and double confederate treat-
ments. Two points are worth noting. First, bids
from round 1 in the double confederate treat-
ment are higher than bids from round 1 in
the confederate treatment. This is consistent
with Nunes and Boatwright’s ﬁnding that bids
are inﬂuenced by posted prices for an unre-
lated product, and it suggests that participants
who are exposed to high posted prices in a se-
ries of warm-up rounds for an unrelated prod-
uct may subsequently be expected to submit
higher bids. However, the difference in round
1 bids between the control and double con-
federate treatments is not statistically signiﬁ-
cantusingeitheraone-sidedt-testorWilcoxon
rank-sumtest(p=0.23and0.35,respectively).
Second, mean bids from the double confed-
erate treatment increase only modestly across
rounds.
Table9presentsthechangeinmeanandme-
dian coffee mug bids between rounds 1 and 9
in the control, confederate, and double con-
federate treatments. We cannot reject the null
hypothesis that mean bids increased by the
same amount across rounds in the control and
double confederate treatments (p = 0.39 in
a one-sided t-test). Results from a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test were similar (p = 0.19 in aCorrigan and Rousu Posted Prices and Bid Afﬁliation 1087
Table 8. Summary Statistics for Coffee Mug Bids in Experiment 3
Control Confederate Double Confederate
Treatment Treatment Treatment (N = 37)
(N = 27) (N = 36)
Standard Zero
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Deviation Bids
Round 1 $1.04 $1.00 $1.26 $0.72 $1.60 $1.00 $2.00 27.0%
Round 2 $1.20 $1.00 $1.68 $1.13 $1.70 $1.00 $2.03 27.0%
Round 3 $1.34 $1.25 $2.04 $1.25 $1.72 $1.00 $2.01 27.0%
Round 4 $1.49 $1.31 $2.07 $1.00 $2.04 $1.00 $2.42 27.0%
Round 5 $1.50 $1.29 $2.40 $1.00 $1.80 $1.00 $2.08 27.0%
Round 6 $1.46 $1.27 $2.04 $1.00 $1.84 $1.00 $2.13 24.3%
Round 7 $1.49 $1.25 $2.39 $1.00 $2.04 $1.75 $2.28 29.7%
Round 8 $1.55 $1.28 $2.56 $1.07 $1.64 $1.00 $1.71 35.1%
Round 9 $1.48 $1.23 $2.65 $1.00 $1.97 $1.09 $2.20 32.4%
Round 10 $1.45 $1.22 $2.71 $1.10 $2.02 $1.06 $2.26 11.0%
Table 9. Summary Statistics for Coffee Mug Bids in Experiment 3
Round 1 Round 9 Difference
Control treatment (N = 28)
Mean $1.04 $1.48 $0.44
Median $1.00 $1.23 $0.23
Confederate treatment (N = 36)
Mean $1.26 $2.65 $1.39
Median $0.72 $1.00 $0.28
Double confederate treatment (N = 37)
Mean $1.60 $1.97 $0.37∗
Median $1.00 $1.09 $0.09
Note: The asterisk (∗) denotes statistically different across control and confederate treatments at the 0.02 level (t =
2.03). No signiﬁcant difference across control and double confederate treatments (t = 0.28).
one-sided test). This suggests that while high
posted prices may lead to increased mean bids
foroneproduct,afﬁliationwaneswhenpartici-
pants see that the same bidders submit unusu-
ally high bids for a second product. Figure 6
shows no clear relationship between the in-
crease in bids across rounds 1 and 9 and
whether participants were exposed to confed-
erates.Table10reportstheresultsofarandom-
effectsanalysis,showingthatonlytheintercept
term and the coefﬁcient associated with the
timetrendaresigniﬁcantlydifferentfromzero.
In particular, gender has no impact on bid-
ding behavior when participants have previ-
ously been exposed to confederate bidders.
Discussion and Implications
Intheabsenceofafﬁliation,highpostedprices
should have no impact on the bids partici-
pants submit in later rounds. If this is the






































9 Control Treatment (N = 28)
Double Confederate Treatment (N = 37)
Figure 6. Initial coffee mug bids versus in-
crease across rounds in experiment 3
repeatedtrialsprovideimportantmarketfeed-
back, thereby providing more reliable value
estimates (see Lusk 2003 for a discussion).
However, to date, no experiment has been
speciﬁcally designed to examine this issue.
Given the ubiquity of repeated-trial experi-
mental auctions, this represents a major gap
in the literature.
In this article, we show that posted
prices have a statistically and economically1088 November 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table10. Random-EffectsEstimationResults













Trend × confederate −0.001 0.030
(0.952) (0.289)
Trend × confederate — −0.048
× male (0.105)
Trend × confederate — −0.002
× income (0.814)
Trend × confederate — −0.040
× GPA (0.256)
R2 0.003 0.011
Note: Single (∗) and double (∗∗) asterisks denote signiﬁcance at the levels
0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
ap-values in parentheses.
signiﬁcant impact on bids submitted in sub-
sequent rounds. This is a key ﬁnding, as re-
searchers who use repeated trials typically use
bids from later rounds in their statistical anal-
ysis. And because the goods for sale in our
experimentwerefamiliarones,ourresultssug-
gest that quality or outside-price information
derived from posted prices are not the pri-
mary factors driving bid afﬁliation. Further-
more, we ﬁnd that the propensity to increase
bids is not dependent on a participant’s initial
bid—participants throughout the value distri-
bution increase their bids. We also ﬁnd that
men are more likely than women to increase
their bids when facing high posted prices, per-
haps suggesting that men are more driven to
win for winning’s sake.
One possible criticism of our study is that
posted prices in confederate treatments were
so high as to effectively turn all bidders into
off-margin bidders. If the explanation to bid
afﬁliation lies primarily in off-margin bidders
inﬂating their bids, our results may not gener-
alize to auction with less extreme outliers. It
is, however, unlikely that off-margin detach-
ment alone is driving our results. For exam-
ple, this detachment explanation conﬂicts with
the results from experiment 3, where we ﬁnd
thatparticipantsexposedtohighpostedprices
in both the candy bar and coffee mug rounds
did not increase their bids the second time
they were exposed. And if off-margin detach-
ment was a primary factor driving bid afﬁlia-
tion in our experiments, we would expect the
off-margineffecttobegreatestamongbidders
at the bottom of the value distribution. How-
ever, as we have discussed, there was no sig-
niﬁcant correlation between ﬁrst round bids in
theconfederatetreatmentsandtheincreasein
bids between rounds 1 and 9.




that these bidders have unrealistic valuations
whenthenextitemisauctionedoff.Therefore,
researchers interested in “inoculating” partic-
ipants against the inﬂuence of one or two bid-
derswithunusuallyhighvaluationscouldruna
series of warm-up auctions with posted prices
and ID numbers.
However, this suggestion comes with two
important qualiﬁcations. First, we cannot be
sure that posting ID numbers in the warm-up
rounds will guard against afﬁliation because
our results depend on the high bidders from
the auction rounds of interest being the same
as those from the warm-up rounds. Second,
Nunes and Boatwright (2004) ﬁnd that high
posted prices have a signiﬁcant positive effect
on WTP bids even if those posted prices are
for an unrelated good.
Based on the results presented here and
in other studies suggesting that posted prices
may inﬂuence bids submitted in subsequent
rounds,wethinkthatresearchersshouldaban-
don repeated-trial Vickrey auctions. Instead,
to avoid bid afﬁliation we suggest that re-
searchers use just one round of bidding for
any given good or bundle of goods. This
could be accomplished by instructing partic-
ipants to submit bids for different goods in
distinct potentially-binding auction rounds ei-
ther simultaneously (e.g., Corrigan and Rousu
2006a; Rousu et al. 2005) or sequentially but
without posting prices between rounds (e.g.,
Noussair, Robin, and Rufﬁeux 2002). For ex-
ample,Rousuetal.(2004)instructparticipants
to submit bids for both conventional and ge-
netically modiﬁed food products in two se-
quentialauctionroundswithoutpostingprices.
While bids in both auction rounds may be af-
fectedbypostedpricesfortheunrelatedgoods
sold in the introductory practice auctions, tak-
ingthedifferencebetweenbidsfortheconven-
tional and GM products should mitigate this
bias.Corrigan and Rousu Posted Prices and Bid Afﬁliation 1089




considering that it is now standard practice for
auction monitors to present participants with
both written and oral explanations of the auc-
tion mechanism, to administer a quiz on the
format of the auction, and then to conduct one
or more practice auctions. Given such a thor-
ough introduction, additional market feed-
back via repeated trials seems unnecessary.
Furthermore, the demand-revealing proper-
ties of Vickrey auctions require that bidders’
valuations be independent. If bids are afﬁli-
ated, the demand-revealing nature of Vickrey
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